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Stable matching in a common generalization of
the marriage and assignment models
Kimmo Eriksson and Johan Karlander
∗
Abstract
In the theory of two-sided matching markets there are two well-known mod-
els: the marriage model (where no money is involved) and the assignment model
(where payments are involved). Roth and Sotomayor (1990) asked for an expla-
nation for the similarities in behavior between those two models. We address this
question by introducing a common generalization that preserves the two impor-
tant features: the existence of a stable outcome and the lattice property of the
set of stable outcomes.
Resume´
Dans la the´orie des “agences matrimoniales a` deux niveaux” il existe deux
mode`les bien connus: le mode`le des “mariages” (sans transactions financie`res) et
celui des “allocations” (avec paiement). Roth et Sotomayor (1990) ont souleve´ le
proble`me de trouver une bonne explication qui rende compte des similarite´s dans
le comportement de ces deux mode`les. Nous nous occupons de cette question en
introduisant une ge´ne´ralisation commune qui conserve les deux aspects impor-
tants: l’existence d’un re´sultat stable et la structure de treillis de l’ensemble des
re´sultats stables.
Keywords. matching, stable matching, core, lattice, optimal matching
1 Introduction
The interest in the theory of matching comes from an unusual blend of disciplines. If eco-
nomic markets are modeled in the language of matching games, then game-theoretical
questions arise that often have combinatorial solutions. Hence, this subject is treated
both in the economic, game-theoretic and combinatorial literature.
By a two-sided matching market we mean a situation where there are two distinct
sets of agents, P and Q, that are to be matched in pairs consisting of one P -agent
and one Q-agent. Roth and Sotomayor (1990) have written a comprehensive survey
of the theory of two-sided matching markets, mainly dealing with two kinds of two-
sided matching markets, called the marriage model and the assignment model. In the
marriage model, the agents have absolute preferences on their candidates for marriage,
∗Both authors have address: Dept. of Mathematics, KTH, S-100 44 Stockholm, Sweden
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as opposed to the assignment model where there is money involved, and the goal of
the agents is to get as big a profit as possible from their match. The possibility of
monetary transfers in this latter model makes it ”flexible” as compared to the more
”rigid” marriage model.
Viewing the matching procedure as a game played by the agents, an outcome of
the game will be a matching of certain P -agents with certain Q-agents, together with
a payoff to each agent in case there is money in the model. Roth and Sotomayor
cites empirical evidence for the importance of stability of an outcome, i.e. absence of
“blocking pairs” — pairs of agents that are not matched but who both have incentive
to break up with their current match in order to match up with each other instead.
For both models mentioned above, a stable outcome is known to exist. Gale and
Shapley (1962) presented an algorithm for finding a stable outcome in the marriage
model. Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) solved the same problem for the as-
signment model. It is also well-known that the set of stable outcomes in both cases,
under certain conditions, is a complete lattice under preferences of all P -agents. In the
marriage model the condition is that preferences be strict. In the assignment game the
condition is that only one assignment is optimal; otherwise we have the lattice property
for the payoffs only, not for the underlying assignments. A consequence of the complete
lattice property is that there exists a unique P -optimal outcome, and this is the solution
found by both algorithms mentioned.
In the present paper, we address a challenge raised by Roth and Sotomayor (1990)
as well as by others: to explain the similarities in behavior between the two models. In
a recent article, Roth and Sotomayor (1996) themselves elaborate on the background
of the question and gives a kind of solution. They present a generalized assignment
game that contains both the old models as special cases, and they show that it too
has the lattice property for payoffs under the condition that the core equals the “core
under weak domination” (or equivalently, that the set of stable payoffs equals the set of
“strongly stable payoffs”), but they cannot guarantee that the set of solutions to their
game is nonempty.
Our approach has both similarities and differences to the approach of Roth and
Sotomayor. We introduce another common generalization of the two old models, in
which we allow for some agents to behave in a way that we call “rigid”. It means that
they accept only one particular payoff in a given assignment. One may think of it as
there being a rule for payoffs recommended by for example a labor union, which some
agents feel obliged to follow while others feel no such obligation. This game is not
a special case of Roth–Sotomayor’s, nor does it include their game. It is possible to
extend their theory to conclude that the set of strongly stable payoffs is a lattice in our
game, but in general the set of stable payoffs will be larger.
By presenting an algorithm that produces a stable outcome, we prove that the set of
stable outcomes is nonempty for our generalized assignment game. The algorithm com-
bines ideas from the algorithms for the two previous models together with a variation
of the technique with augmenting paths, well-known in matching theory.
Furthermore, we introduce a certain non-degeneracy condition that specializes to
strict preferences in the marriage model and to uniqueness of the optimal assignment
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in the assignment game. Under this condition we can prove that set of stable outcomes
(i.e. payoff combined with assignment) is a complete lattice, and also that the algorithm
produces the P -optimal outcome.
We are grateful to a referee of an earlier version of this paper for pointing us to the
recent article of Roth and Sotomayor.
2 The old models and the new generalized model
In order to set the context, we present in turn the marriage model, the assignment game
and our new generalized game: the RiFle game.
2.1 The marriage model
In the marriage model, let P be a set of men and Q be a set of women. Every man
has preferences on the women, and every woman has preferences on the men. The
preferences can be represented by a list of names in order of preference, where a lists
only the potential partners he or she would prefer being matched with to being single.
Let µ be an assignment of men to women. If µ has two matched pairs p1
µ
←→ q1 and
p2
µ
←→ q2 where p1 prefers q2 to q1 and q2 prefers p1 to p2 then the pair p1, q2 is a
blocking pair. A stable assignment is an assignment without blocking pairs.
Gale and Shapley (1962) presented a nice algorithm for finding a stable assignment
in this model. Briefly, the algorithm runs over a finite number of time steps; in each
step every man proposes to the woman who is most preferred on his list of preferences.
Each woman tentatively engages the most prefererred of her proposers and reject the
rest of them. The rejected men remove the rejecting woman from the top of their list,
and in the next time step they proceed to the next one. The engaged man stays, and
proposes to the same woman at the next time step too. When every woman has at
most one proposer, the stable assignment has been obtained.
2.2 The assignment game
In the assignment game of Shapley and Shubik (1972), as described in Roth and So-
tomayor (1990), let P = {p1, . . . , pn} be a set of employers and Q = {q1, . . . , qn} a set of
workers. Every pair (pi, qj) has a potential productivity αij ≥ 0. If µ is an assignment
(i.e. a matching of P -agents to Q-agents), then its total productivity is
Tµ =
∑
pi
µ
←→qj
αij .
The total productivity is distributed as payoffs: every employer pi gets payoff ui ≥ 0
and every worker qj gets payoff vj ≥ 0, such that the sum of the payoffs is Tµ. An
outcome in the assignment game is an assignment µ together with compatible payoff
vectors u¯ and v¯.
An outcome is stable if there are no blocking pairs. This is equivalent to the condi-
tion ui + vj ≥ αij for all i, j, since ui + vj < αij would mean that the pair (pi, qj) could
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be better off by leaving their current matches and join forces to obtain the productivity
αij . Shapley and Shubik proved that the underlying assignment of a stable outcome is
always optimal, i.e. it yields maximal total productivity.
The existence of a stable outcome in the assignment game was nonconstructively
proved by Shapley and Shubik (1972). Demange, Gale and Sotomayor (1986) gave an
algorithm that constructs an outcome. The algorithm is a sort of auction procedure,
where the employers raise their bids on the workers until only one bidder is left. We
will use ideas also from this algorithm when devising the procedure for a more general
model.
It is a natural idea to include reservation prices in the model. This means that an
agent pi or qj can choose to stay unmatched, in which case he receives his reservation
price, denoted by uri ≥ 0 and v
r
j ≥ 0 respectively.
2.3 New model: the RiFle assignment game
Let us now define our new model, the RiFle assignment game (RI for rigid and FLE
for flexible) and see how it includes both the previous ones. Let P = {p1, . . . , pn} and
Q = {q1, . . . , qn} be two equally large sets of agents. (By introduction of dummy agents,
this condition can always be met.) To each pair (pi, qj) is assigned a pair of nonnegative
real numbers (βij , γij).
The interpretation of these numbers is that for each possible partnership (pi, qj),
the potential productivity is αij = βij + γij, and it is somehow prescribed that this
productivity should be distributed so that pi gets the payoff βij and qj gets the payoff
γij. An agent who will always demand that this distribution rule be followed strictly
(that is, who will accept the prescribed payoff only; no more, no less) is called rigid.
An agent who is willing to negotiate and use side payments is called flexible. In our
model, every agent is either rigid or flexible.
In this model it is easy to represent reservation prices uri and v
r
j : for every agent
we insert a rigid dummy agent whose value to him is the reservation price, but whose
value to anyone else is zero.
Let R be the set of all rigid pairs: pairs (pi, qj) such that at least one of the agents
pi and qj is rigid. Let F be the set of all flexible pairs: pairs (pi, qj) such that both
agents are flexible. Hence, R ∪F = P ×Q.
2.4 A first example
Consider the following productivity matrix where the entries are (βij, γij):
q1 q2 (r)
p1 (3,3) (3,6)
p2(r) (2,5) (10,5)
Here p2 and q2 are rigid agents, while p1 and q1 are flexible. The only flexible pair is
then (p1, q1). What is a reasonable payoff in this game? Under the matching p1
µ
←→ q1,
p2
µ
←→ q2, the rigid pair will receive u2 = 10 and v2 = 5 while the flexible pair will
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split the productivity 3 + 3 = 6, for example as u1 = 2 and v1 = 4. However, such an
outcome of the game will not be stable: the unmatched pair (p1, q2) is then a blocking
pair since by cooperating they would improve their payoffs from 2 to 3 and from 5 to 6
respectively.
2.5 Stability in the RiFle game
We shall now formalize the notion of stable outcomes discussed in the previous example.
Definition 2.1 An outcome of the RiFle assignment game is a matching µ of P -agents
to Q-agents, together with a payoff, i.e. a pair of vectors (u¯, v¯) ∈ Rn×Rn. An outcome
is denoted by (u¯, v¯;µ). The outcome is feasible if it satisfies:
1. Individual rationality. All payoffs must be nonnegative, i.e. ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0
for all pi, qj.
2. Rigidity. A rigid agent, say pi, who is matched, say to qj , must get payoff
ui = βij . If the match qj is a flexible agent, then his payoff must be vj ≥ γij .
3. Pareto optimality. The sum of all payoffs equals the total productivity, that
is, ∑
pi∈P
ui +
∑
qj∈Q
vj =
∑
pi
µ
←→qj
αij.
A stable outcome is a feasible outcome satisfying the stability condition of absence
of blocking pairs. This can be expressed as{
ui + vj ≥ αij for (pi, qj) ∈ F
ui ≥ βij or vj ≥ γij for (pi, qj) ∈ R
A payoff (u¯, v¯) is feasible (resp. stable) if (u¯, v¯;µ) is a feasible (resp. stable) outcome
for some matching µ. Such a matching µ is said to be compatible with the payoff (u¯, v¯).
2.5.1 Justification for the RiFle assignment game
There are both mathematical and empirical reasons for introducing this new model.
To start with the latter, it is a fact that most markets are not entirely free but are
regulated in various ways, for example by salary policies, and that certain people are
more prone to ignore regulations than other people. The RiFle assignment game is a
crude attempt to take this into account in the model.
Now for the mathematical justification. If all agents are flexible, then we are back in
the assignment game. On the other hand, if all agents are rigid, then the fixed payoffs
are directly translateable to preferences and we are back in the marriage model. It is
therefore justified to say that the RiFle assignment game is a common generalization of
these models. We will now proceed with showing that the fact that the two old models
have certain important properties in common can be explained by showing that these
properties are owned also by the RiFle assignment game.
5
3 Summary of results for the RiFle assignment
game
It is time to give a brief description of the results we will prove for the RiFle assignment
game. Concepts such as core and strong stability that are mentioned below will be
defined in Section 4 as we go along.
1. There are no side payments in stable outcomes.
2. The set of stable outcomes equals the core of the game.
3. The set of strongly stable payoffs is a lattice (in general not complete) under
P -preferences.
4. The set of stable outcomes is nonempty, and we present an algorithm that finds
a stable outcome.
The algorithm is a heavy piece of work and we treat it separately in Section 5. This
is as far as we can get without putting some additional restrictions on the model. In
Section 6 we will then introduce a non-degeneracy condition on the game, specializing
to strict preferences in the marriage model and to uniqueness of the optimal assignment
in the assignment game. Given non-degeneracy, we can add the following results to our
list.
5. Among stable outcomes, the underlying matching is uniquely determined by the
payoff.
6. The set of stable outcomes is a lattice
7. The lattice is complete and hence it has unique P -optimal and Q-optimal ele-
ments.
8. The algorithm produces the P -optimal outcome.
3.1 A comparison with Roth and Sotomayor’s approach
Actually, the generalized assignment game of Roth and Sotomayor (henceforth refered
to as the R–S game) works with utility functions in the vein of Demange and Gale
(1985). For simplicity though, we will assume that utility is linearly and uniformly
correlated to money, so that we can describe their approach in terms of plain money
only. We also change their notations somewhat to facilitate comparison to the RiFle
game.
In this version of the R–S game, we have a matrix of pairs of numbers (βij , γij) and
reservation prices uri , v
r
j . Payments are allowed within matched pairs only, so a feasible
outcome (u¯, v¯;µ) must to begin with satisfy ui + vj = βij + γij if pi
µ
←→ qj (as well as
individual rationality, of course). Given such an outcome, we can define the monetary
transfer to pi from his match qj by si = ui− βij . In the R–S game it is prescribed that
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the monetary transfers must belong to some set S. If S = {0}, then the R–S game
specializes to the totally rigid RiFle game, i.e. the marriage model. If S = R then it
specializes to the totally flexible RiFle game, i.e. the assignment game. (As we will see
below, there will be no side payments in the RiFle game either, although they are not
a priori ruled out).
Roth and Sotomayor assumes that all monetary transfers belong to the same set S,
as opposed to the situation in the RiFle game where the monetary transfer in rigid pairs
must be zero, while in flexible pairs it can be any real number. However, we have found
that the R–S game can be generalized in the same direction, with a separate set Sij of
possible monetary transfers for every possible pair in a matching, without affecting the
proofs of Roth and Sotomayor!
The main results proved for the R–S game is that the set S of stable payoffs is a
compact lattice under the following three assumptions:
1. S is non-empty,
2. S is closed, and
3. S coincides with Ss, the set of strongly stable payoffs.
As we will discuss more in detail later, an outcome is strongly stable if it has no weak
blocking pair, i.e. a pair such that one agent prefers it to his current match while the
other agent is indifferent.
Assumption 3 is the crucial one, and it does not usually hold for the RiFle game.
However, what Roth and Sotomayor really prove, although they never explicity state it,
is that the set Ss of strongly stable payoffs in the R–S game is always a lattice (possibly
empty or not closed). Hence, this is true for the RiFle game too, as we discuss in
Section 4.3.
4 Results without non-degeneracy conditions
We will present our results in the order of the list in the summary, starting with the
two easy observations.
4.1 Side payments
Though flexible agents are not a priori unwilling to engage in the practice of side
payments, there will be no such thing in a stable outcome.
Proposition 4.1 If pi is matched to qj in a stable outcome, then their joint payoff
equals their joint productivity, i.e. ui + vj = αij.
Proof. If pi is matched to qj then necessarily ui + vj ≥ αij , thanks to the rigidity
condition for rigid pairs and the stability condition for flexible pairs. Then Pareto
optimality forces all these inequalities to be equalities.
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Remark. If the rigidity condition were relaxed so that a flexible agent in a rigid
pair could accept also a payment less than his prescribed share, side payments could
occur in a stable outcome. For example, consider the following market:
q1 (r) q2 (r)
p1 (3,3) (4,6)
p2 (1,1) (10,5)
Here q1 and q2 are rigid agents, while p1 and p2 are flexible. If the rigidity condition is
relaxed for flexible agents, then
p1
µ
←→ q1, p2
µ
←→ q2, u1 = 5, u2 = 8, v1 = 3, v2 = 5
is a stable outcome where p2 has paid p1 two units to make him match with q1 so that
p2 can match with the for him much more profitable agent q2.
The rigidity condition we have chosen does not take into account such long-term
planning by agents, but rather assumes that the agent p2 in the above example would
prefer getting his rigid share of ten units than his present lot of eight, although this
solution would be unstable and in fact he would end up with just one single unit.
Though the lattice analysis depends on our choice of rigidity, the algorithm we will
present below is insensitive to this choice; regardless of this definition it will find a
stable outcome without side payments!
4.2 The core of the RiFle assignment game
An outcome y is dominated by another outcome x if there exists a coalition A of agents
such that every member of A prefers x to y and the rules of the game allow them to
enforce x over y. The core of a game is defined as the set of undominated outcomes.
Proposition 4.2 The core of the RiFle assignment game equals the set of stable out-
comes.
Proof. It is trivial that outcomes in the core must be individually rational and
satisfy rigidity, Pareto optimality and stability. Hence the core is a subset of the stable
outcomes. For the other direction, we must show that an outcome outside the core
cannot be stable. But a coalition C cannot enforce obtaining more money than their
total productivity under cooperation in pairs within C, so at least some pair must get at
most as much money from the coalition as if they were to split their joint productivity.
Since both prefer the coalition, they also prefer the pair. Hence they are a blocking
pair.
4.3 Strong stability
Let us now dig out as much as we can get from the work of Roth and Sotomayor, cf.
Section 3.1. First, we give a formal definition of strong stability. Recall that a weak
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blocking pair is a pair such that one agent prefers it to his current match while the
other agent is indifferent. A flexible pair can never be weakly blocking; if one agent is
indifferent and the other agent makes a profit, then the latter one can share his profit
to make both agents prefer the match. Consequently, is is sufficient to consider rigid
pairs.
Definition 4.3 An outcome is strongly stable if it is stable and contains no weak block-
ing pair, i.e.
ui = βij ⇒ vj ≥ γij and vj = γij ⇒ ui ≥ βij for (pi, qj) ∈ R
Similarly we define a strongly stable payoff.
Roth and Sotomayor like to assume that the set of strongly stable payoffs coincides
with the set of stable payoffs, as they do in the assignment game, as well as in the
marriage model when preferences are strict. However, there seems to be no reasonable
condition to guarantee the validity of such an assumption when there are both rigid
and flexible agents simultaneously. For example, consider the following market, where
we give just αij for flexible pairs but (βij , γij) for rigid pairs:
q1 q2 (r)
p1 18 (10,7)
p2 21 (14,5)
Here the agent q2 is rigid while all the others are flexible. This game is non-degenerate
in the sense that we will define in Section 6, but nonetheless it has a stable solution
that is not strongly stable:
p1
µ
←→ q1, p2
µ
←→ q2, u1 = 10, u2 = 14, v1 = 8, v2 = 5
is stable but it is not strongly stable since it has a weak blocking pair, (p1, q2), where
the flexible agent p1 is indifferent while the rigid agent q2 would strictly prefer matching
with p1 to his current match with p2.
We define the partial order of P -preferences by µ ≥P µ
′ if u¯ ≥ u¯′ and v¯ ≤ v¯′
(componentwise comparisons). Generalizing the R–S game to accept different sets Sij
of monetary transfers for different pairs, the analysis of Roth and Sotomayor implies:
Proposition 4.4 The set of strongly stable payoffs in the RiFle assignment game is a
lattice under ≥P .
However, this lattice needs not be compact so we cannot say that it will have a
P -optimal member (in fact, it usually will not).
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5 There exists a stable outcome of the RiFle as-
signment game
Our first main result is that the RiFle assignment game has always a stable outcome,
which we can find by an algorithm.
Theorem 5.1 The set of stable outcomes in the RiFle assignment game is nonempty.
We will prove the theorem by giving an algorithm that finds a stable outcome. In
Section 6 we will discuss an additional nice property of the algorithm: if a certain non-
degeneracy condition is satisfied, then the outcome found by the algorithm is optimal
among stable outcomes for all P-agents.
5.1 Discretization
Our algorithm assumes a discrete version, where all βij, γij , ui and vi are integers.
Hence it works also when all numbers are multiples of 1/N for some N > 0. To prove
the theorem for reals, one can approximate the numbers by multiples of 1/N and let N
tend to infinity. The payoff vectors will then converge to some limit vectors that will
satisfy the compatibility and stability conditions. We do not reproduce the detailed
argument here; it will be very similar to the corresponding argument concluding the
solution to the ordinary assignment problem in M. Hall’s book [5].
5.2 Overview of the algorithm
The algorithm is a kind of auction mechanism. We begin with the price vector v¯ =
[0, . . . , 0]. In the course of the algorithm, the prices on the Q-agents will only increase,
never decrease. The algorithm will in each step modify the price vector v¯ as well as a
map µ : P → Q, until µ is injective, that is, a matching. If, at a given point in the
course of the algorithm, we have µ(pi) = qj , we say that pi proposes to qj at this point.
If pi proposes to qj and at least one of the agents pi and qj are rigid, we say that this
is a rigid proposal.
First, we define a function fij(x) that tells us the value of qj to pi if the price on qj
is x, that is, if qj is to get the payoff vj = x. The value will tacitly depend also on the
current map µ:
fij(x) =


βij + γij − x if (pi, qj) ∈ F
βij if (pi, qj) ∈ R and either x < γij or x = γij and µ(pi) = qj
0 if (pi, qj) ∈ R and either x > γij or x = γij and µ(pi) 6= qj
The dependence on the map µ will assure that in a rigid pair, when the price on a
Q-agent qj is as high as rigidity allows for a P -agent pi, and pi is not currently mapped
to qj , then he will never be so in the future either, because the value is set to zero. In
this way, we bar rejected rigid proposals from ever being renewed.
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For each pi, let Di be the set of potential partners of maximal value to pi, that is,
Di := {qk : fik(vk) = max
j
fij(vj)}.
The goal of the algorithm is to produce an assignment µ and payoff vectors u¯ and v¯
satisfying the following conditions:
1. qi ∈ Di for all i.
2. ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0 for all i, j.
3. If µ(pi) = qj , then ui + vj = βij + γij. If in addition (pi, qj) ∈ R, then ui = βij
and vi = γij.
The second and third conditions say that the payoffs are compatible with the assign-
ment. The first condition implies stability; there can be no blocking pair if every pi has
his best possible partner.
The algorithm will in each step modify the price vector v¯ and the map µ so that
it always satisfies µ(pi) ∈ Di. (Note that the set Di is not fixed but depends on the
current price vector v¯.) As soon as the map µ is injective, the algorithm halts.
As in many matching algorithms, we will use a notion of “augmenting paths”. Let
us define the relation qj ∼ qk if there exists a pi such that µ(pi) = qj and qk ∈ Di,
that is, if qj has a proposer that equally well could have proposed to qk. Further, let us
extend this relation by transitivity, so we say that qk1 is connected to qkm if there exists
a “path” qk1 ∼ qk2 ∼ . . . ∼ qkm .
The algorithm is structured into subprocesses. Subprocess A is basically the Gale–
Shapley algorithm for finding stable matchings in the marriage model. After subprocess
A is completed, every Q-agent will be subject to at most one rigid proposal. This will
be used in subprocess B, which finds augmenting paths from Q-agents that are already
in the image of µ to Q-agents that have either no proposals or a rigid proposal. After
subprocess B is completed, there are no such augmenting paths, so if µ is still not
injective, then there must be some Q-agent that has several proposers but which is not
part of an augmenting path. In subprocess C, prices are increased on all such Q-agents
and all Q-agents connected to them, and everything is repeated anew.
The algorithm has two important properties: first, the prices v¯ never decrease; and
second, if at some point some qj gets a proposer, then qj will never again be without
proposers during the algorithm. The algorithm will halt when every qj has a proposer.
5.3 The algorithm
We are given the sets P and Q of agents, and the pairs of nonnegative integers (βij, γij)
for every pair (pi, qj) of P ×Q. We will also have a price vector v¯ and a map µ : P → Q
that will both be modified during the algorithm. In the first step we set v¯ := [0, . . . , 0]
and choose µ such that µ(pi) ∈ Di for every pi. This is possible, since it is obvious from
the definition that every Di is always nonempty.
5.3.1 Subprocess A
Find all qj that have a rigid proposal. For every such qj, find a proposer pi such that
γij is maximal, that is,
γij = max{γkj : µ(pk) = qj and (pk, qj) ∈ R}.
Set vj := γij. We keep the proposer pi, and bar from ever proposing to qk again any
other pk that at this point proposes rigidly to qk.
Subsequently, for every P -agent pi, we recompute their sets Di after the modification
of the price vector v¯. A new map µ is chosen such that µ(pi) ∈ Di for every pi. Repeat
the process, increasing v¯ in each run, until nothing changes anymore.
When subprocess A halts, every Q-agent will be subject to a rigid proposal from at
most one P -agent. However, a flexible Q-agent may still have several flexible proposers.
5.3.2 Subprocess B
Recall that qj ∼ qk means that qj has a proposer that equally well could have proposed
to qk, and that qk1 is connected to qkm if there exists a path qk1 ∼ qk2 ∼ . . . ∼ qkm .
Abusing notation, let pkl denote a proposer that equally well could have proposed to
qkl+1 instead of to qkl. In subprocess B we do the following:
1. Suppose we find a path qk1 ∼ qk2 ∼ . . . ∼ qkm such that qk1 has at least one
extra proposer pi except for pk1 , while qkm has no proposer at all. Then we modify µ by
setting µ(pk1) := qk2 , . . . , µ(pkm−1) := qkm. For all other P -agents, µ maps as before.
This augments the image of µ by one agent, qkm . Now subprocess A is run again.
2. Suppose we find a path qk1 ∼ qk2 ∼ . . . ∼ qkm such that qk1 has at least one
extra proposer pi except for pk1 , while qkm is subject to a rigid proposal. (We may
here have m = 1.) As in the previous case, we modify µ by setting µ(pk1) := qk2, . . . ,
µ(pkm−1) := qkm . Let ps be the rigid proposer of qkm . Set µ(ps) to be undefined for the
moment, and bar ps from ever proposing to qkm again. For all other P -agents, µ maps
as before. This does not change the image of µ, but the set of barred rigid proposals
has been augmented. Now subprocess A is run again.
As long as any of these alternatives is possible, the process is repeated. (If several
possibilities are open, choose one.)
5.3.3 Subprocess C
Let M be the set of all Q-agents that are (i) connected to some Q-agent who has more
than one proposer, and (ii) not connected to any Q-agents that have either no proposal
or a rigid proposal. Modify the price vector v¯ by increasing vj by one for all qj ∈ M .
Now subprocess B is run again. The whole process is repeated until µ has become
injective.
5.4 Correctness of the algorithm
We will now show that subprocess C, and hence the algorithm, will eventually halt. In
each step µ(pi) ∈ Di holds. Every qj that has ever had a proposer will always have
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some proposer. The price vector v¯ sometimes increases, but never decreases. In the
first step, v¯ = [0, . . . , 0]. This means that if some qk does not have a proposer at some
point, then vk is still zero, in which case the value fik(vk) of qk for pi is greater than
zero. When qj is a Q-agent who does have a proposer pi, and the price is allowed to
increase sufficiently, we will arrive at a nonpositive value of qj for pi, fij(vj) ≤ 0. Then
qj /∈ Di, so eventually we must have qk ∈ Di for some pi. When subprocess C is used,
there must eventually exist a path from some qj with several proposers to qk. When
subprocess B is used, qk gets a proposer. In this way all Q-agents must eventually get
proposers, so µ is a matching.
The price vector v is determined by the algorithm, and will be nonnegative. Suppose
that µ(pi) = qj . Then if (pi, qj) ∈ F , we set ui := βij + γij − vj . On the other hand,
if (pi, qj) ∈ R, we set ui := βij. The only thing that remains to be checked is that all
ui are nonnegative. But since Q-agents with no proposers always have had zero price,
they have always been of positive value to all P -agents, and the same thing must of
course hold for the matched pairs.
5.5 An example of running the algorithm
Finally, let us illustrate the algorithm with an example. Let P = {p1, p2, p3, p4, p5} and
Q = {q1, q2, q3, q4, q5}, with three rigid agents: p1, p2 and q1. The following matrix of
recommended productivity distributions is given.
q1 (r) q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 (r) (7,6) (9,9) (4,9) (6,5) (6,4)
p2 (r) (8,5) (9,9) (3,5) (7,7) (2,5)
p3 (5,8) 17 13 13 8
p4 (1,5) 8 10 9 6
p5 (1,6) 12 8 9 7
From the beginning we have the price vector v = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0]. Then the value matrix
(fij(vj)) at this point is:
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 7 9 4 6 6
p2 8 9 3 7 2
p3 5 17 13 13 8
p4 1 8 10 9 6
p5 1 12 8 9 7
µ(P ) = [q2, q2, q2, q3, q2]
Here for each row the maximum values are boxed. Since in this case the maximum
value was unique in each row, there is no freedom of choice for the map µ. Now run
subprocess A. Only q2 has rigid proposals; both of the same payoff, γ12 = γ22 = 9.
Pick one of these proposers, say p1, and bar p2. Raise the price on q2 to 9, so now
v = [0, 9, 0, 0, 0]. Recompute the values and the map:
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q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 7 9 4 6 6
p2 8 0 3 7 2
p3 5 8 13 13 8
p4 1 -1 10 9 6
p5 1 3 8 9 7
µ(P ) = [q2, q1, q3, q3, q4]
For µ(p3) we had a choice between q3 and q4. Now run subprocess A. Only q1 has a
new rigid proposal, raising the price on q1 to 5, giving v = [5, 9, 0, 0, 0]. The values and
the map does not change, so we can proceed to subprocess B. None of the conditions
in subprocess B are satisfied, so we proceed to subprocess C.
In subprocess C we identify the set M = {q3, q4} as being of the desired kind: q3
has two proposers, it is connected to q4, and q4 has a proposer. They are not connected
to anyone else. Raise the price by one on both q3 and q4, to obtain v = [5, 9, 1, 1, 0].
Subprocess B still does not kick into action, so we return to subprocess C where the
price on q3 and q4 is raised another unit, yielding v = [5, 9, 2, 2, 0].
q1 q2 q3 q4 q5
p1 7 9 4 6 6
p2 8 0 3 7 2
p3 5 8 11 11 8
p4 1 -1 8 7 6
p5 1 3 6 7 7
µ(P ) = [q2, q1, q3, q3, q4]
Now we see that the prices on q3 and q4 have been raised enough for p5 to find it
worth considering proposing to q5 instead. In this situation subprocess B identifies the
path q3 ∼ q4 ∼ q5, where q3 has two proposers while q5 has none. This is an augmenting
path, so we change the map accordingly to µ(P ) = [q2, q1, q4, q3, q5]. Now the map is
injective, so the algorithm halts. From the price vector we get payoffs v¯ = [5, 9, 2, 2, 0]
and u¯ = [9, 8, 11, 8, 7]. The reader is encouraged to check that this is indeed a stable
outcome, since no unmatched pair can do better by cooperating.
6 Introducing a non-degeneracy condition
Neither in the marriage model nor in the assignment game is the set of stable outcomes
always a lattice (although in the assignment game the set of stable payoffs is always a
lattice). In degenerate cases there may be, for example, two different best possible out-
comes. To guarantee the lattice property some non-degeneracy conditions are needed.
For the marriage model a sufficient condition is strictness of preferences, which in the
RiFle model with all agents rigid translates to
βij = βij′ ⇒ j = j
′, γij = γi′j ⇒ i = i
′.
For the assignment game, the stable outcomes form a lattice if and only if there
is a unique optimal assignment, that is if there is a unique matching µ such that the
14
total productivity Tµ is optimal. A sufficient condition for uniqueness of the optimal
assignment is that for any two matchings µ and µ′, and a minimal coalition C of agents
such that all C-agents are matched to each other in both µ and µ′, we have that µ and
µ′ must either coincide on C or yield different total productivities on C, i.e.
∑
pi,qj∈C
pi
µ
←→qj
αij =
∑
pi,qj∈C
pi
µ′
←→qj
αij ⇒ µ = µ
′ on C.
The non-degeneracy condition that we have found sufficient for the lattice property
in the RiFle game contains the conditions above as obvious special cases.
Definition 6.1 Given a coalition C of agents and an assignment µ (i.e. no payoffs),
we say that the total payoff to C under µ is forced if all matched pairs of one agent in
C and one agent outside C are rigid, because due to rigidity and the absence of side
payments the payoff to C must then be
∑
pi∈C
pi
µ
←→qj
βij +
∑
qj∈C
pi
µ
←→qj
γij .
(Recall that an unmatched agent who gets his reservation price is represented as being
matched to a rigid dummy agent.)
We say that the RiFle assignment game is non-degenerate if the following holds for
any two matchings µ and µ′: if C is a minimal coalition such that the payoff is forced
under both µ and µ′, and the forced payoffs are equal, then µ and µ′ coincide on C.
In the special case when all agents are flexible, this condition is obviously identical
to the earlier one. In the special case when all agents are rigid, the minimal coalitions
consist of one agent and the condition says that his payoff is never indifferent over
choice of match, i.e. his preferences are strict.
Remark. Is the non-degeneracy condition computable? Yes, but in exponential
time. The condition translates to the following inequalities, which must hold for any
k > 0 and any renumbering of the agents:
1.
α11 + . . .+ αkk = α21 + . . .+ αk,k−1 + α1k.
2.
α11 + . . .+ αkk + γ00 = α10 + . . .+ αk,k−1 + γk+1,k.
3.
α11 + . . .+ αkk + β00 = α01 + . . .+ αk−1,k + βk,k+1.
4.
α11 + . . .+ αkk = α12 + . . .+ αk−1,k + γ01 + βk,k+1.
The agents p0 and q0 are allowed to be identical to pk+1 and qk+1 respectively.
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6.1 Determination of matching from payoff
Given a stable outcome in a non-degenerate RiFle game, it is possible to determine the
underlying matching from the payoff.
Proposition 6.2 In a non-degenerate game, only one matching is compatible with a
stable payoff.
Proof. To begin with, we can directly determine the match of every rigid agent, say
pi with payoff ui, since by rigidity ui = βij for some qj , and by non-degeneracy all βij
for varying j are different.
Remaining agents are flexible and matched to each other. By non-degeneracy there
is a unique matching of the remaining agents that has the remaining payoff as total
productivity.
Combining this observation with the result that the set of strongly stable payoffs
is a lattice (Proposition 4.4), we have that the set of all strongly stable outcomes is a
lattice in the non-degenerate case. But we want to say something even stronger: that
the set of all stable outcomes is a lattice. One possible way of completing the result
would be to show that every outcome that is stable but not strongly stable can be
approximated arbitrarily close by a strongly stable outcome. However, this turns out
to be as complicated as showing the theorem from first principles without refering to
the work of Roth and Sotomayor, so we prefer to do it that way instead.
6.2 Lattice property of stable outcomes
We are going to prove the lattice property. By abusing notation, let µ and µ′ denote
the outcomes with underlying matchings µ and µ′ and payoffs (u¯, v¯) and (u¯′, v¯′) respec-
tively. We define the partial order of P -preferences by µ ≥P µ
′ if u¯ ≥ u¯′ and v¯ ≤ v¯′
(componentwise comparisons).
Theorem 6.3 The set of all stable outcomes, under the partial order ≥P of P -preferences,
is a lattice when the game is non-degenerate.
Proving the lattice theorem will take some work. We must find a join µ ∨ µ′ and a
meet µ∧µ′ under ≥P . It is obvious what we would like µˇ = µ∨µ
′ to be: it should have
payoffs uˇi = max(ui, u
′
i) and vˇi = min(vi, v
′
i) and a compatible matching. But there is
not necessarily a compatible matching!
6.2.1 Why non-degeneracy is needed
Consider the following productivity matrix:
q1 q2 (r)
p1 (r) (4,5) (2,3)
p2 11 (6,7)
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There are two stable outcomes: on one hand, p1
µ
←→ q1 and p2
µ
←→ q2 with payoff
u1 = 4, u2 = 6, v1 = 5, v2 = 7 is a stable outcome; on the other hand p1
µ′
←→ q2 and
p2
µ′
←→ q1 with payoff u
′
1 = 2, u
′
2 = 6, v
′
1 = 5, v
′
2 = 3 is a stable outcome too. But
the payoff given by uˇi = max(ui, u
′
i) and vˇi = min(vi, v
′
i) is not compatible with any
matching.
We shall show that under the non-degeneracy conditions, a compatible matching µˇ
can be found.
6.2.2 Finding a compatible matching
Fix two stable outcomes µ and µ′. We represent any unmatched agent in µ or µ′
as being matched to a rigid dummy agent, such that the real agent’s payoff is his
reservation price, should they cooperate. The dummy agent prefers being matched to
being unmatched. If an agent was unmatched in both µ and µ′, he is now matched to
the same dummy agent in both cases.
We start by defining the digraph G(µ, µ′) on the vertex set P ∪ Q as the union of
the matchings µ and µ′, i.e. with the following edges:
{(pi, qj) : pi
µ
←→ qj or pi
µ′
←→ qj},
labeled by the corresponding payoffs, (ui, vj) or (u
′
i, v
′
j). Since µ and µ
′ are matchings,
this graph has vertices of degrees zero, one and two only. We now give some edges
directions as follows. Direct an edge (pi, qj) towards qj if pi prefers this edge, i.e. if it is
the only edge incident to pi, or if the payoff to pi from this edge is strictly greater than
the payoff from the other edge. No edge becomes bidirected, because if the two agents
both prefer being matched according to one outcome they would constitute a blocking
pair in the other outcome, contradicting stability.
Hence, we now have a graph where edges are either undirected or directed. Since
no degrees are greater than two, all connected components are paths or cycles. If a
component is a path, its two endpoints are dummy agents and the last edge at both
ends is directed from the dummy towards the real agent.
Lemma 6.4 In a non-degenerate game, a path in G(µ, µ′) between two rigid agents
cannot consist of indifferent agents only (unless it is an undirected two-cycle).
Proof. Let C be the set of agents in-between the two rigid agents. Then it is a
minimal coalition with forced total payment in both µ and µ′. If all agents in C were
indifferent, then the forced total payoffs would be equal, contradicting non-degeneracy.
Recall that non-degeneracy implies strict preferences of all rigid agents.
Lemma 6.5 In a non-degenerate game, an indifferent (and hence flexible) agent in
G(µ, µ′) cannot be preferred by a flexible agent.
17
Proof. Without loss of generality, say that pi
µ
←→ qj where pi is indifferent and
preferred by qj . Indifference of pi means that ui = u
′
i, while preference of qj means that
vj > v
′
j . Hence u
′
i + v
′
j < ui + vj = αij , so if qj were flexible then pi and qj would be a
blocking pair in µ′. Thus qj must be rigid.
Lemma 6.6 In a non-degenerate game, all directed edges in a component of G(µ, µ′)
must be directed in the same way along the path or cycle.
Proof. A directed path in a component must end in an indifferent agent. Thanks
to the previous lemma, the last edge in a directed path must then be directed from a
rigid agent towards a flexible agent. Suppose we have two directed paths with different
directions in a component (a path or a cycle). Then we must have a path segment of in-
different agents whose first and last members are prefered by rigid agents, contradicting
the result of Lemma 6.4.
This gives us, to begin with, the following result that is well-known in the two old
models.
Proposition 6.7 If the non-degeneracy condition holds, then the set of unmatched
agents is the same in all stable outcomes.
Proof. The previous lemma says that all directed edges must have the same direction
along a path in G(µ, µ′), but every path component has differently directed edges at the
ends. Hence there can be no path components, so there are no agents that are matched
in µ but unmatched in µ′ or vice versa.
Now we are ready to prove the lattice theorem.
Proof of Theorem 6.3 Since all directed edges in a cycle are directed in the
same way, either µ or µ′ has all its directed edges from P -agents to Q-agents, while
the other matching has all its directed edges from Q-agents to P -agents. Hence, on
this component the first matching is compatible with the payoffs uˇi = max(ui, u
′
i)
and vˇj = min(vj , v
′
j) and the other matching is compatible with uˆi = min(ui, u
′
i) and
vˆj = max(vj, v
′
j). By taking the P -optimal matching on each component we obtain
µˇ. Since all matched pairs and their payoffs come from either µ or µ′ we must have
both individual rationality and rigidity and Pareto optimality in µˇ. It remains to prove
stability of µˇ. But by a standard argument a blocking pair in µˇ would be a blocking
pair also in either µ or µ′ contradicting the assumption of their stability. For µˆ the
argument is analogous.
To summarize, we have found a stable matching compatible with the payoff (uˇ, vˇ)
and by Proposition 6.2 there can be only one such matching.
6.3 Completeness of the lattice
Lemma 6.8 The set of stable payoffs is compact.
18
Proof. Let µ be a matching and let Sµ be the set of stable payoffs compatible with
µ. Then Sµ is a compact set, since all the defining relations for feasibility and stability
are equations and non-strict inequalities. Consequently S is closed, since it is a finite
union of compact sets.
From this result and the lattice result in the non-degenerate case, we immediately
have the following.
Theorem 6.9 If the RiFle game is non-degenerate, then the set of stable outcomes is
a compact lattice. In particular, it has unique P -optimal and Q-optimal outcomes.
6.4 The algorithm revisited
We now know that when the game is non-degenerate, there is a unique P -optimal
outcome. As we mentioned in the introduction, the classic algorithms for finding a
stable outcome in the marriage model and in the assignment game do in fact find
precisely the P -optimal solution, and we claim that this is the case also for our new
algorithm. The proof idea is quite simple, but some details get technical and we skip a
few of them.
Theorem 6.10 If the non-degeneracy condition is satisfied, then the outcome found by
the algorithm is optimal among stable outcomes for P-agents.
Proof. (Sketch.) Let (m1, m2, ..., mn) be the outcomes of the Q-agents in the P-
optimal matching. We enumerate the steps in the algorithm as follows: Every turn of
proposals in subprocess A counts as one step. The same goes for every construction of
a path in subprocess B and every application of subprocess C.
Let [v
(i)
1 , v
(i)
2 , ..., v
(i)
n ] be the Q-outcomes at step i in the algorithm. We want to show
that v
(i)
k ≤ mk for all i, k. We notice that all the v
(i)
k are nondecreasing and can only
increase in subprocess A or subprocess C. We now study these two cases. We assume
that v
(i)
k ≤ mk for all i, k and show that v
(i+1)
k ≤ mk.
Subprocess A. Suppose v(i+1)a ≥ ma. The increase of va comes from qa accepting
a proposer pb at step i + 1. We claim that there is no stabil matching µ giving qa
an outcome smaller than v(i+1)a . Indeed, suppose µ(qa) = pc and µ(pb) = qd. In this
matching we must have vd ≥ md ≥ v
(i)
d . If vd > v
(i)
d then pb must prefer qa to qd, given
the Q-outcomes in µ, since qa at least did not prefer qd to qa at step i. But then (pb, qa)
blocks µ.
The case vd = v
(i)
d is more complicated. It is possible to show, by using the non-
degeneracy conditions, that the only possibility is that pb, qd are flexible, qa is rigid and
qd ∼ qa in subprocess B. Then qd must be contained in a set M , such that qa /∈ M ,
and such that M is overdemanded (i.e., the set A: pi ∈ A ⇒ Di ⊆ M contains more
elements than M .) at step i − 1. We can use the non-degeneracy conditions to show
that the path containing qd and qa is the only augmenting path at step i. This means
that every stable matching with vd = v
(i)
d must match pb to qa. This shows that there
can be no stable matching µ such that µ(pb) = qd.
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Subprocess C. At step i+ 1 the outcomes for the Q-agents in an overdemanded set
M are raised one step. Suppose qa ∈ M and v
(i+1)
a > ma. Then there is a set N ⊆ M
such that qa ∈ N and v
(i+1)
k = mk + 1, i.e., v
(i)
k = mk for all qk ∈ N . (The mk:s must,
of course, all be integers.) The P-optimal matching µP has vs ≥ v
(i)
s for all s such that
qs /∈ N . It is then possible to show that N must be overdemanded at these outcomes.
Since the stable matching µP cannot contain an overdemanded set this is impossible.
7 Concluding remarks
We have introduced an analyzed a new game, the RiFle game, that is a common gen-
eralization of the marriage model and the assignment game, in order to explain the
similarities of the results for these two different games. Roth and Sotomayor addressed
the same problem recently, and we have compared our results. Our game is not a spe-
cial case of theirs, but we have remarked that their analysis can be extended to our
game. However, the assumptions differ. In particular, the key assumption of Roth and
Sotomayor that the set of stable and strongly stable outcomes are equal does not hold
for our game, but nonetheless we can show that the set of stable outcomes of the RiFle
game is a lattice under P -preferences. An additional feature of our game is the exis-
tence of a stable outcome, which we guarantee by presenting an algorithm that finds
one (indeed, the P -optimal one in the non-degenerate case).
On the other hand, Roth and Sotomayor work with utility functions and not just
with plain money. It is not clear how utility functions could be included in our model;
both the algorithm and the non-degeneracy condition seem to depend on linearity be-
tween money and utility.
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